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Abstract
We applied Barsalou’s Frame Theory to analyze the structure of operational-
ized classiVcatory texts used in psychiatry, such as the International ClassiVca-
tion of Disorders, Chapter V (ICD-10), and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM-IV), which provide the basic terminology for today’s psychiatric classiV-
cation system. We studied the classiVcatory principles of “schizophrenia” and
“speciVc phobias” as examples of mental disorders. In addition, we studied Parkin-
son’s disease as an example of a disorder on the border between neurology and
psychiatry. Initial results suggest that although the texts of modern classiVcation
systems are highly operationalized and appear straightforward and simple, their
internal structure is highly complex with subframe structures of divergent types
emerging. Also, the comparison of both modern systems of classiVcation shows
that the diUerences are greater than just time-course diUerences or terminological
diUerences. We show that by applying Barsalou’s frame theory, internal struc-
tures of standard classiVcatory texts in psychiatry may become discernible, and
that focusing on well-deVned concepts of brain functions like the sense of agency
promises to yield useful insights into the pathophysiology, symptomatology and
classiVcations of major mental disorders.
1 Introduction
Barsalou developed a theory of frames as the general format of the representa-
tion of concepts in human cognition (Barsalou 1992a, 1992b). The theory was
further developed, and integrated into Barsalou’s theory of conceptual symbol
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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systems (Barsalou 1999). Barsalou frames represent their referents by means of
a recursive structure in terms of attributes and the values they take. Following
the conventions developed in Petersen (2007/2015), Barsalou frames can be rep-
resented by directed graphs.1 In a frame for an arbitrary category of objects, a
central node represents the object itself; it is marked with a double line. The node
is “central” in that all arrows originate directly from it or from nodes connected
to it. Labeled arrows connect a node to other nodes. The arrows represent at-
tributes, the labels name them. The nodes to which the arrows lead represent the
values that the attributes take. The number of attributes is not limited, nor is the
depth of embedding.
ATTRIBUTE 1 ATTRIBUTE 1.1 
ATTRIBUTE 2 
object value value 
value 
Figure 1: General structure of a Barsalou frame
Crucially, the attributes are functional relations: for any object they assign ex-
actly one value and for any object the same attribute can only be applied once.
In frame graphs it is not permissible to have more than one arrow with the same
label originate from one and the same node. DiUerent nodes may, however, have
the same attribute. Think, for example, of a frame-format physical description of
a person. Possible attributes can include height, weight, and age.2 Any person,
at a given time, has the descriptive dimensions of height, weight or age only once
and each of these take just one value. For a simple notation for the fact that for
an object x the attribute a takes the value y, one can use the usual mathemati-
cal notation for a function taking a value for a given argument: “a(x)=y”. One
can write “height(Jones) = 1.76 m” for the fact that the attribute height for the
person Jones takes the value 1.76 m. A nonfunctional attribute would be a char-
acteristic such as a ‘disease’: namely, a person can have several, just one or no
1 Barsalou (1992a, 1992b) uses directed labeled graphs, too. However, his representations have a more
complex, although essentially equivalent, structure. See Petersen (2007/2015) for a discussion of the
alternative graph representations of frames.
2 We use small capitals for attribute terms.
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diseases at all. Consequently, the attribute “disease” would not necessarily take a
unique value. It would be inappropriate to notate the fact that Jones suUers from
diabetes as “disease(Jones) = diabetes”; if Jones suUered from a bronchitis at the
same time, one would have to put this as “disease(Jones) = bronchitis”. However,
if disease really were to be a function(al attribute), its value for a given person
at a given time cannot be both diabetes and bronchitis because these are diUer-
ent diseases. In constructing frames for the representation of concepts, attributes
have therefore to be chosen very carefully to use only attributes that are really
functions. Representing the fact that a person suUers from diabetes would require
a frame with attributes such as insulin production or insulin resistance.
Frame-format descriptions are thus descriptions in terms of functional attri-
butes and the values they take. Such descriptions are very frequently used in
practice in one form or the other. For example, a lab report with values for various
substances in the blood such as Fe, Mg, or cholesterol, represents a frame in terms
of concentrations of these substances in the blood sample analyzed. A reference
to a publication represents a frame-format description in terms of author(s), year
of publication, title, publisher, etc. Another instance of frame-format description
is passports; they contain a frame description of the bearer.
Barsalou frames may also contain various types of constraints that relate to the
values of attributes. For example, a constraint might delimit the range of possible
values for an attribute, or it might correlate the values of two attributes.
Frames for diseases or disorders would start from a frame for the person with
attributes added for those parts or functions of the organism which are aUected.
A disease can be described at diUerent levels. A description of diabetes at the
level of diagnostics would refer to attributes such as blood sugar level, while
a description at the organic level might relate to the function of the pancreas.
Capturing the causes of the disease would require attributes relating to lifestyle or
to the genetics of the person. The description of a disease would then essentially
involve the choice of relevant attributes and the values they take. Such a frame
may be restricted to a certain level of description or it may combine more than
one level. Including both the organic and the symptomatic level would enable
one to represent causal relations between elements of the frames, for example
between insulin production and blood sugar.
Using frames for the analysis of mental disorders is demanding, but oUers the
opportunity for a more precise and explicit conceptual analysis. The available
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descriptions of disorders do not come in terms of functional attributes (see Tables
1 and 2 below). To begin with, in most cases of particular mental disorders it is
not made explicit what the respective disorder is a disorder of. What exactly is
disturbed in schizophrenia? Is there a uniform disorder underlying all those cases
currently classiVed as a particular disorder? The usual descriptions of mental dis-
orders describe symptoms and diagnostics, such has “hearing voices” in the case
of schizophrenia. The description of a disorder may refer to behavioral character-
istics or to other levels such as bodily symptoms or genetics. It may be in terms of
phenomena or in terms of malfunctioning. It will include temporal characteris-
tics such as the frequency and duration of symptoms, the age of the patient, the
chronological progression of the disorder. It may also include causal components
such as lifestyle, social environment, infections, intoxication, etc. It must provide
for a weighting of symptoms, for exclusion criteria, and for provisions such that a
certain number out of all possible symptoms must be present. A frame approach
should Vrst make a decision about the level(s) of description which it aims at and
will then have to try to determine the appropriate set of attributes for capturing
the characteristics of the disorder. In this article, we will represent initial ex-
ploratory heuristic frame descriptions of three disorders: schizophrenia, speciVc
phobias, and Parkinson’s disease. The last section represents considerations to-
wards a more principled approach to the frame analysis of mental disorders in
terms of faculties of the mind.
2 ClassiVcation of mental disorders
Two major classiVcation systems for mental disorders have been developed and
are in use globally: the World Health Organization (WHO) publishes the “In-
ternational ClassiVcation of Disorders,” which is currently in its 10th revision
(hence “ICD-10”) (World Health Organization, 1990) and the American Psychi-
atric Association (APA) publishes the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual,” which
is currently available in its fourth edition (hence “DSM-IV”) (American Psychi-
atric Association, 2000). Both systems are currently being revised by interna-
tional working groups with a view to publish the newly revised versions ICD-11
and DSM-V in 2013/2014. Both classiVcation systems share a number of features:
• They are operationalized: they explicitly specify rules on how to arrive at
a certain diagnosis
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• They are anosological: they do not make assumptions about the nosological
entities that may underlie a certain diagnosis. This implies that they do not
make assumptions about the pathophysiology of any of the mental disorders
classiVed in the respective diagnostic system.
Both systems have been tested for inter-rater reliability in the early 1990’s,
and one of their strengths and advantages is clearly that they have reduced the
ambiguities previously associated with psychiatric diagnostics. After appropriate
training, the inter-rater reliability is around 80%. These systems have become
widely accepted internationally. The majority of international psychiatric scien-
tiVc literature uses either ICD-10 or DSM-IV. A survey of the use of ICD or DSM
in psychiatric journals showed that some country-speciVc preferences are still
observable between both systems, i. e., US-psychiatrists prefer DSM-IV, whereas
German psychiatrists prefer ICD-10 (Lopez-Munoz et al., 2008).
As a rule, the constitutive features of mental disorder speciVed in these clas-
siVcations include i) a syndrome of clinical symptoms, ii) some disease course
characteristics and iii) the results of laboratory tests or neuroimaging methods.
The latter, however, are mainly used for detecting brain tumors, inWammatory or
metabolic disorders as causes of mental disorders.
In Germany, the use of the ICD-10 has been mandatory since 2000 for in- and
out-patient services. For example, reimbursement by health insurance companies
in the somatic disorders is based on diagnosis-related groups, which are founded
in ICD-10 diagnoses. The oXcial version is published by the German Institute
of Medical Documentation and Statistics (DIMDI), with annual updates of the
German modiVcation (ICD-10-GM), so that the actual 2010 version of the ICD-
10-GM features some minor diUerences compared to the original WHO ICD-10
version (www.dimdi.de). The German-language version issued by DIMDI is a
trinational version which is also valid in Austria and Switzerland.
ICD-10 contains all somatic and all mental disorders, the latter are listed in
Chapter F and contain the following major diagnostic groups (Table 1).
While the somatic disorders are only listed in ICD-10 and no speciVcation for
their diagnosis is given, the mental disorders are explicitly deVned considering
characteristic symptoms, time-course criteria, and exclusion criteria. In contrast
to ICD-10, DSM-IV only deals with mental disorders, but also contains explicit
rules for arriving at certain diagnoses similar to chapter F of ICD-10. A number
of diUerences still exist between the diagnostic rules for some – but not all –
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Table 1: Mental Disorders in ICD-10 (Chapter F) (WHO, 1992)
Chapter F class Designation
F0 Organic, including symptomatic mental disorders
F1 Mental and behavioral disorders due to psychoactive substance use
F2 Schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional disorders
F3 Mood [affective] disorders
F4 Neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders
F5 Behavioral syndromes associated with physiological disturbances and phys-
ical factors
F6 Disorders of adult personality and behavior
F7 Mental retardation
F8 Disorders of psychological development
F9 Behavioral and emotional disorders with onset usually in childhood and
adolescence
mental disorders between both classiVcation systems, and those pertaining to the
mental disorders discussed in this chapter will be delineated in the ensuing text.
It should be mentioned at this point that there are also a number of regional vari-
ations of classiVcation systems still in use for mental disorders, e.g., in China or
Latin America, but in international research and for the purposes of international
scientiVc projects, such regional codes have not gained any importance.
Besides the advantages of providing highly reliable, standardized and inter-
nationally widely accepted rules for diagnosing mental disorders, these classi-
Vcation systems have also been criticized for the aforementioned diUerences in
operational details, for not including pathophysiological processes, and for ag-
glomerating a range of putatively diUerent nosological entities into single disease
groups. These issues are currently being debated intensively in the APA and
WHO workgroups in charge of revising DSM-IV and ICD-10. However, even
considering the tremendous progress in elucidating pathophysiological processes
involved in a range of mental disorders, it currently appears rather unlikely that
these advances have already been made far enough to warrant the inclusion of
pathophysiology criteria in DSM-V or ICD-11.
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3 Applying frame theory to texts of psychiatric
classiVcation
The main purpose of this initial stage of a joint research project between the
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy and the Department of Linguis-
tics and Information Science of the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf was to
demonstrate the feasibility of using Barsalou’s Frame Theory to analyze texts of
psychiatric classiVcation with a view to systematically assessing the structure un-
derlying the classiVcation of mental disorders. The selection of mental disorders
to be studied in the Vrst phase of the research project was guided by the idea
that one of the more frequent mental disorders was to be included. It should be
diagnosed on the basis of clinical symptoms and it should provide some varia-
tions of time-course. We chose schizophrenia for this purpose, as it provides a
large number of cases and fulVlls these criteria. It has a range of time-course
variants, and it is characterized by a set of hierarchical clinical diagnostic crite-
ria. A second mental disorder was studied because in the course of analyzing
schizophrenia, we realized that the analysis was hampered by a lack of infor-
mation about the neurobiological foundations of schizophrenia, and the frame
structure turned out to indicate a high degree of complexity. We therefore chose
the group of speciVc phobias, since the neurobiology of fear disorders is com-
paratively better known, and the clinical courses and characteristics are not as
complicated as in schizophrenia. We decided to round up this initial set of inves-
tigations with a neurological disorder featuring a clearly deVned neurobiological
foundation and associated symptoms of a mental disorder: Parkinson’s disease is
characterized by the degeneration of a set of neurons in the midbrain and ensuing
degeneration of the Vber tracts that connect these speciVc areas of the midbrain
with other brain areas. This results in the typical shaking palsy of patients with
Parkinson’s disease. In addition, approximately 30 % of all patients with Parkin-
son’s disease also suUer from aUective or cognitive symptoms, which may lead
to mental disorders such as depression and dementia.
3.1 Frame analysis of schizophrenia
Both DSM-IV-TR (DSM-IV Text Revision) and ICD-10 feature a range of schizo-
phrenia-like symptoms of importance for diagnosing schizophrenia and schizo-
phrenia-related disorders like persistent delusional syndromes or schizoaUective
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disorder, which constitutes an overlap of both mood symptoms and schizophre-
nia-like symptoms. For the purpose of the initial analysis of these criteria, our
project focused on the major groups of “schizophrenia” (F20 in ICD-10; 295.10-
90 in DSM-IV). The diagnosis of schizophrenia according to DSM-IV or ICD-10
is a multi-step process. First, it is important for the clinician to ascertain that
a number of symptoms are present for a suXciently prolonged period of time.
While the types of symptoms are compatible – but not identical – between both
diagnostic systems, the time course criterion varies signiVcantly (four weeks in
ICD-10 and six months in DSM-IV). The symptoms comprise so-called “positive”
symptoms like hallucinations and delusions and “negative” symptoms like loss of
interest, lack of initiative and social withdrawal. Table 2 gives an overview of
the diagnostic criteria comparing DSM-IV (text revision edition of 2000, hence
“DSM-IV-TR”) and ICD-10:
It is important to realize that two partly divergent sets of diagnostic categories
exist. However, the principal components are comparable. We chose to use the
ICD-10 criteria for a Vrst analysis, since it is the type of criteria set relevant
for Germany, and since it is widely used in Europe as compared to the DSM-
IV criteria. Figure 2 shows some aspects that a frame for the ICD-10 deVnition
of schizophrenia may contain.
This frame shows that one of the major challenges will be to determine which
functions underlie the pathophysiology of the major symptoms like hallucina-
tions and delusions. We have added place holders, because much more work
is needed to demonstrate whether functional systems such as a “reality check”
system exist in the human brain, and whether they become dysfunctional in
schizophrenia. We are currently performing such investigations by deriving in-
formation from the scientiVc literature on the set of such systems as identiVed by
neuroimaging or other assessment techniques. It is likely that such systems, or
“modules” as they are called in systems analyses of the central nervous system,
are at the root of the pathophysiology of the functional impairments observed
in mental disorders (Zielasek & Gaebel, 2008; Seitz et al., 2011). Also, this initial
analysis shows that the structure of the schizophrenia frame will be very com-
plicated, probably leading to a substantial number of subframes. As there are
associations between the positive symptoms as a group of symptoms, this may
lead to a formal constraint (for example between the various types of delusions
diUerentiated in the ICD-10 criteria). In the course of developing DSM-V, the
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Table 2: Operationalized diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia compared between ICD-10 (WHO,
1992) and DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
ICD-10 DSM-IV-TR
Clinical criteria Criterion A
A) Thought echo, thought insertion or withdrawal, and
thought broadcasting
B) Delusions of control, influence of passivity; delusional
perception
1) Delusions
C) Hallucinatory voices giving running commentary on the
patient’s behavior, or discussing the patient among them-
selves, or other types of hallucinatory voices coming from
some part of the body
2) Hallucinations
3) Disorganized speech
D) Persistent delusions of other kinds that are culturally
inappropriate and completely impossible
E) Persistent hallucinations in any modality when accom-
panied either by fleeting of half-formed delusions without
clear aective content, or by persistent over-valued ideas,
or when occurring every day for weeks or months on end
F) Breaks or interpolations in the trains of thought, result-
ing in incoherence or irrelevant speech, or neologisms
G) Catatonic behavior 4) Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
H) Negative symptoms 5) Negative symptoms
A significant and consistent change in the overall quality
of some aspects of personal behavior
Evaluation criterion Evaluation criteria for criterion A:
Aminimum of one very clear symptom (and usually two or
more if less clear-cut) belonging to any one of the symp-
toms in groups (A) to (D) above, or symptoms from at least
two of the groups referred to as (E) to (H)
Two or more symptoms
Only one Criterion A required if delusions are bizarre or
hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running com-
mentary on the person’s behavior or thoughts, or two or
more voices conversing with each other
Criterion B
Social/occupational dysfunction
Time criterion Time criterion
Criterion C
One month or more Duration: continuous signs of the disturbance persist for
at least 6 months. This 6 month period must include at
least one month of symptoms that meet Criterion A
Exclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Extensive depressive or manic symptoms unless it is clear
that schizophrenic symptoms antedated the aective dis-
turbance
Criterion D
Schizoaective and mood disorder exclusion
Criterion E
Presence of overt brain disease Substance/general medical condition exclusion
States of drug intoxication or withdrawal
Criterion F
Relationship to a pervasive developmental disorder
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search for such “clusters” of symptoms became very important. Nevertheless,
the associations are merely statistical, since every positive symptom may occur
independently of others. The same holds for the association between symptoms
and course characteristics. Even the association between certain symptoms and
prognosis is not a strict association, but rather a statistical association. This leads
to the question as to how the diUerent course speciVers may be incorporated into
a frame analysis. Schizophrenia has diUerent course types which are speciVed in
DSM-IV as shown in Table 3.
Person 
Perception Drive 
Real (or) 
Unreal 
Object 
Thought 
Affect 
Impaired 
Single 
Thoughts 
Flattened 
Decreased 
Others? 
Salience 
Out of 
“ego” 
Not 
“ego” 
IN
TE
RP
RE
TA
TI
O
N
 
Figure 2: Some aspects of a schizophrenia frame analysis
It will be a major issue to devise methods of representing such temporal aspects
of mental disorders in the usual notation of frames. This initial analysis is at best
very preliminary and subject to change as research into the pathophysiology ad-
vances. However, schizophrenia does not lend itself easily to frame analysis, and
may even indicate necessary extensions of frame theory once temporal and causal
aspects come into play. Another challenge arises when sets of criteria with not yet
clariVed relations to functional systems of the brain are used. Although the latter
is not necessary for establishing diagnostic categories with prognostic validity
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Table 3: Course specifiers of schizophrenia in DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
Description
1. Episodic with inter-episode residual symptoms
2. Episodic with no inter-episode residual symptoms
3. Continuous
4. Single episode in partial remission
5. Single episode in full remission
6. Other or unspecified pattern
and for indicating the necessity of therapy, it would become a necessity if func-
tional subsystems and their relationship to symptoms needed to be deVned for
frame analysis. With the current knowledge, frame analysis could still be useful
for analyzing historic shifts in the deVnition and understanding of “schizophre-
nia” as a diagnostic construct in psychiatry – not relying on the identiVcation
of the “true” modules disturbed in schizophrenia, but rather on terminological
descriptions. This will be the focus of the ongoing analysis besides the deVnition
of the dysfunctional modules. Central texts for such an analysis would be the
conception of “dementia praecox” by Kraepelin (1899), the initial deVnition of the
schizophrenias as a group of mental disorders by Bleuler (1911), and the introduc-
tion of a hierarchy of schizophrenia-deVning symptoms by Schneider (1971).
3.2 Frame analysis of speciVc phobias
While fear is a normal and physiological element of human existence serving
to protect an individual in dangerous situations, its diagnostic value relates to
inappropriate fears occurring in harmless situations, or with negative conse-
quences for the individual in excess of any useful warning function of fear. Both
ICD-10 and DSM-IV deVne a variety of fear disorders ranging from stimulus-
speciVc anxiety disorders like the so-called “speciVc phobias” (including fear of
narrow rooms, fear of spiders etc.) to generalized anxiety disorders. ICD-10
(http://www.who.int) deVnes speciVc phobias as “phobias restricted to highly spe-
ciVc situations such as proximity to particular animals, heights, thunder, dark-
ness, Wying, closed spaces, urinating or defecating in public toilets, eating cer-
tain foods, dentistry, or the sight of blood or injury.” For the purpose of frame
analysis, we chose speciVc phobias because in contrast to schizophrenia they are
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characterized by a rather narrow spectrum of symptoms, clearly deVned fear-
inducing stimuli, and a rather well-known neurocircuitry. Thus, it could be hoped
that frame analysis would lead to rather simple frame structures. However, neu-
roimaging frequently shows that phobic stimuli activate a range of neurocircuits
(Pull, 2008; Damsa et al., 2008) including the amygdala and other structures of
the brain like the anterior cingulate cortex and the insular cortex. Such “fear
circuitries” are necessary conditions for bringing about fear, but it is still not
completely known what exactly goes wrong with this circuitry in phobias. An
intriguing question also arises as to the role of variations in genes involved in the
metabolism of the neurotransmitter serotonin (Munafo et al., 2008), as these seem
to increase the likelihood of the development of fear disorders. Also, learning
experiences seem to play an important role. Thus, while it is quite well known
which brain regions are involved and which normal functions are usually served
by such regions, it is still a considerable step to fully explain the psychopathology,
i. e., the set of signs and symptoms so characteristic of speciVc phobias. There are
still missing links in the chain of events from genetic predisposition via learning
experiences and initial fear reactions to the full clinical picture of a speciVc pho-
bia. All of these steps would ideally be modeled in frame analyses of the future. A
peculiar challenge lies in the delineation from “healthy” fear reactions. Similar
to the dimensional assessment of hallucinations and delusions in schizophrenia,
there appears to be a substantial overlap between fear reactions in the healthy
control population and in those individuals who develop anxiety disorders. In ad-
dition, there is not only an emotional reaction to fear stimuli, but also a vegetative
reaction with a diverse range of somatic signs like sweating and increased heart
rates. Thus, a frame for speciVc phobias will need to include a range of functional
circuits. An initial proposal is made in Figure 3.
3.3 Frame analysis of Parkinson’s disease
Parkinson’s disease used to be characterized as a neurodegenerative disorder with
relatively speciVc degeneration of a set of neurons in the substantia nigra of
the midbrain. The neurotransmitter produced by these neurons is dopamine,
and consequently there is a loss of dopaminergic neurotransmission in the target
projection area of these neurons in the striate corpus of the basal ganglia. This
leads to the main symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, i. e., resting tremor, akinesia,
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No (imaginative) 
Figure 3: Aspects of a frame analysis of specific phobias
and rigor (Lees et al., 2009). However, other neurotransmitter systems are also
involved in the neurodegenerative process. An intricate neurocircuitry of motor
control underlies these pathophysiological processes.
A simple Vrst approach towards a frame analysis of the impairment of the mo-
tor system in Parkinson’s disease would result in a frame as depicted in Figure 4.
This frame does not yet take into account the fact that a signiVcant proportion
of patients with Parkinson’s disease not only suUer from motor symptoms, but
also from aUective and cognitive impairments. It is not completely understood
how these are related to the primary nigrostriatal degenerative process, but may
involve a spread of the initially locally conVned neurodegenerative process to
serotonergic and noradrenergic brain systems in depressive symptoms (Storch et
al., 2008) and a more widespread involvement of cholinergic neurotransmission
and frontostriatal circuits in patients with cognitive symptoms (Zgaljardic et al.,
2004). A unifying hypothesis for the relationship between the loss of dopamin-
ergic neurons and the ensuing neurocircuitry alterations leading to aUective and
cognitive symptoms has been proposed by Calabresi and colleagues (2006). Thus,
similar to schizophrenia and speciVc phobias, the pathophysiology of mental dis-
orders even in the framework of well-deVned neurodegenerative processes in-
volves a large number of brain areas and neurocircuits, making frame analysis
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MOTOR CONTROL Person 
Pyramidal 
Tract, Motor 
Cortex 
Extrapyramidal 
Tracts, Basal 
Ganglia 
Figure 4: Frame of neuronal elements involved in motor symptoms in Parkinson’s disease
diXcult especially when higher brain functions involved in mood and cognition
are aUected.
4 Frame analysis of the pathophysiology of mental
disorders
In order to gain a foothold in this complex area, we began an analysis of the con-
cept of “agency,” which is central to understanding many core features of mental
disorders. We assume that the sense of agency is based on an integration process
(weighting) of diUerent agency cues which are provided by diUerent processes (or
“modules”), including motor control, perception, proprioception, thinking (back-
ground beliefs). Therefore, delusions of control cannot be explained by a break-
down in motor processes only – in contrast, we need a multifactorial account of
agency that integrates the diUerent agency cues mentioned above (Synofzik, Vos-
gerau & Newen 2008). This account can thus serve as an example of the analysis
of symptoms in terms of faculties of the mind.
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AGENCY_CUE #3 
AGENCY_CUE #2 
AGENCY_CUE #1 
perception faculty 
PERCEPT 
perceived 
state 
COMPARISON 
COMPARISON 
CONTEXT 
situation 
match: 
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sciousness 
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Figure 5: A multifactorial account of agency in frames. Different faculties of the mind are pre-
sented by shaded areas. Possible neural implementations are attached to the according
nodes as black rectangulars (SMA: supplementary motor area, PPC: posterior parietal
cortex, EBA: extrastriate body area).
In Figure 5, a frame is shown that (partly and exemplarily) describes the mul-
tifactorial account of agency. For example, a mismatch at the comparator com-
paring perceived state and goal state serves as one agency cue indicating that
I am not the agent of the action (this is the case, for instance, when someone
nudges your arm during an arm movement such that you do not reach your goal).
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However, in other situations such a mismatch might not lead you to think that
you are not the agent of the action: e.g., perceived state and goal state will not
match when you fail to hit the bull’s eye as planned when playing darts. Never-
theless, the situation of playing darts and your background knowledge that your
skills in darts are not perfect will function as another cue which is, in this situ-
ation, weighted more highly than the mismatch. This results in your ascribing
the agency to yourself.
DiUerent faculties of the mind (exemplarily) re presented by diUerently shaded
areas since the two-dimensional paper makes an adequate depiction of the diUer-
ent faculties as attributes of a central “person” node very inconvenient. The frame
analysis shows how diUerent faculties of the mind interrelate in the production
of speciVc phenomena (agency as an aspect of self-consciousness in this case).
Delusions of control can be described as disturbances in speciVc values in the
frame, for example by unusual values of the comparison outcomes due to deVcits
in the comparison process or by unusual values of agency ascriptions due to
deVcits in the weighting process of diUerent cues. At the same time, the frame is
able to display the complex eUects that disturbances in single nodes can have; e.g.,
a disturbed value of a COMPARISON node might lead to disturbed values in the
ASCRIPTION node in cases where it is not outweighed by other agency-nodes.
This example of analyzing speciVc phenomena and their pathological distur-
bances is, moreover, embedded into a general theory of self-consciousness (Vos-
gerau 2009), such that the general pattern of analysis can be fruitfully applied
to other phenomena (e.g., authorship of thoughts or ownership of body parts;
Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen 2008).
Moreover, the frame makes it possible to integrate data concerning neural cir-
cuits. Just to give a few examples: some brain areas are attached to some nodes in
the frame; there is some evidence that renders these brain areas plausible can-
didates for being the neural correlate of the according values in the frame. The
motor cortex is likely to be involved in forming and issuing the motor command
(Beurze et al. 2010); there is considerable evidence that the supplementary motor
area (SMA) plays a crucial role in the generation of a copy of the motor command
(“eUerence copy”) that is further used in prediction (Haggard & Whitford 2004).
It has been suggested that the comparison process between predicted state and
perceived state may involve the cerebellum and the parietal cortex (Blakemore,
Wolpert & Frith 1999); in addition, it has also been suggested that the poste-
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rior parietal cortex (PPC) and the extrastriate body area (EBA) may participate
in the network of areas correlating with the sense of agency (Yomogida et al.
2010). These examples show how experimental data on the neural correlates of
the diUerent faculties of the mind can be straightforwardly integrated into the
frame analysis, such that a comprehensive picture of the complex interrelations
between diUerent faculties of the mind, diUerent disruptions of speciVc processes,
and diUerent brain regions involved in these processes emerges.
5 Discussion
Frame theory can be applied to modern operationalized diagnostic criteria of
mental disorders, but its use is limited in two ways: i) the mental processes un-
derlying the pathophysiology of mental disorders are not yet suXciently clariVed
and ii) frame theory cannot yet render temporal and causal dimensions of mental
disorders. Also, the diagnostic structure of some mental disorders is complicated,
since such disorders involve a number of functional brain modules, leading to
intricate frame structures. During our initial analyses, frequently the question
arose as to which functions of the human brain are impaired and how this re-
sults in a clinical symptom. As exempliVed even by the relatively simple case
of phobias, there is an intricate network of interacting brain modules and the
pathophysiology of the psychopathologic phenomena proves to be of a very in-
tricate nature. Identifying constraints between attributes in frames for mental
disorders will prove to be diXcult because in clinical reality there is hardly ever a
strict correlation, but rather a certain predisposition or statistical association. An-
other aspect which needs to be addressed is the question of a continuum between
symptoms of mental disorders and “diluted” or less intense similar symptoms in
healthy people. This has been analyzed for some major symptoms of mental dis-
orders like delusions and hallucinations, and could indicate that there may be no
absolute boundaries between “health” and “disease.” This issue is referred to as
the “dimensional” nature of mental disorders and one of the central topics of the
current revision process of DSM-IV (Brown & Barlow, 2005). It will be necessary
to include such aspects in the Frame Analysis of mental disorders.
With such limitations and challenges at hand, it seems attractive to postpone
any further frame analysis of mental disorders until the pathophysiology of the
mental disorders to be analyzed is known. However, as the example of Parkin-
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son’s disease shows, it seems unlikely that “simple” pathophysiologies will be
discovered. Thus, we decided to focus on core features of the pathophysiology
and symptomatology of psychotic disorders, in this case the disturbance of the
concept of self-agency, to limit the scope of phenomena to be explained by more
detailed frame analyses of mental disorders. Two features speak in favor of using
frame theory: i) it provides a systematic and well-deVned approach which pro-
vides general rules usable for all mental disorders as regards their pathophysiol-
ogy, symptomatology and classiVcation, and ii) it may also be useful for analyzing
the historic changes of diagnostic conceptions of mental disorders. Thus, the ap-
proach to progress in this area – as exempliVed by schizophrenia – needs to be
twofold: Vrstly, it is well worth the eUort to analyze historic texts of the early
times of the conceptualization of schizophrenia as an example, because these def-
initions were made without any knowledge about the pathophysiology of the
disorder and have developed over time. Secondly, it is necessary to analyze the
neurobiological underpinnings of core concepts of mental disorders using frame
analyses including time-variability and individual precipitating factors for their
disturbances in mental disorders.
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